Abortion Books

Although it is still a radical idea in our day (which accounts for the stalking of patients, bombing of Clinics and the killing of medical personel)these women realized that control over one's reproductive system was essential for survival. Women who found themselves pregnant had very limited options (there were no laws against firing pregnant workers or dismissing students and child support payments were very lax in enforcement by modern standards)and Jane sought to change that system. The change is even more remarkable in light of the fact that many of these women were college students like myself.

Because this book is so well written, you can almost feel the excitement and terror as many collective members were changing the system. Understandably, the use of pseudonyms was a necesitity both then and now.

Even though we know that abortion was legalized in Roe the mood is so well set in the book, "Never Again" rings throughout the pages. Although Jane members do not regret what they did, it is obvious that they do not want another generation to resort to such extra-legal methods. One generation was once too many.

In addition to individual reading and research, this book might be useful for a course on American women's history and/or a general course in the 1960's-1970s.

For another excellent novel from Bambola, check out A Refiner's Fire.

Wrong.

Journalist Barbara Seaman had the courage and insight to peer behind the happy facade that characterized the first wave of American sexual liberation,at some troubling realities. She asked simple questions -- the kind that annoy everyone,because they're unanswerable. Why was so much research being done on female contraceptives that were potentially harmful,with none being done on male contraceptives? (The condom STILL remains the only male option.) Since sexual intercourse is generally more pleasurable for men than women,why didn't men introduce harsh chemicals and dangerous contraptions into their systems? If the pill was so safe,why was it making women feel so sick? Why were patients who reported their symptoms told that it was all in their heads? Why were the physicians and chemists behind all these products male?

_The Doctor's Case Against the Pill_ compresses many of Seaman's findings and inaugurated her career as a lifelong whistle blower and advocate of women's health. Like her later work, _Free and Female_,it is a pathfinding book that exposes the ideology behind the health industry and the self-interest of so many medical practitioners. It reminds us how easily retrograde assumptions are recycled into the most seemingly progressive and forward-looking social initiatives. Like most pioneering works,its results still brace and shock; the expanded edition incorporates Seaman's more recent research. This is a must-read for anyone interested in women's health and women's history.

As many people know, because of this book,there are now warning labels on packages of birth control pills. Thirty years ago,Barbara Seaman had the courage to play that most thankless role:the party-pooper. In the swinging '60s and '70s, her findings met with a cold reception. But because of her work,women today lead healthier and safer lives.

Well, that was thirty years ago... why buy the book today? First, because it is an important historical record of the way female patients have been mistreated. And second, because Seaman has updated it to include new information about the Pill's pitfalls over the years as well as an excellent chapter about Norplant, a contraceptive used widely around the globe even though it causes its own host of health problems. No wonder Gloria Steinem has called Seaman "the first prophet of the women's health movement."

Until the invention of antiseptic procedures in the 1930s, all surgery carried risk of infection and possible death. Bans on abortion (which were not enacted until the turn of the 20th century) were not a measure of fetal protection, but a response to the realities of Victorian double standards and antisepsis.

While legislators could have just as easily prohibited tonsilectomies, they decided to focus on a procedure exclusively related to women because conventional logic held women did not realy like sexual relations (even with their husbands)--only doing it to become mothers, and the act of procreation was what ultimately made husbands faithful.

Most educated people now also know that if a husband is truly determined to leave his family, a wife's desire for children will not produce a serious change of heart. Furthermore, the birth control methods that we take for granted were not available, and many of the foremothers of feminism mentioned in this book were also ingrained with the idea that good girls did not talk about anything sexual period.

During that time period, it was not uncommon for "well-respected" husbands to have extramartial affairs, and they unsuprisingly brought home sexually transmitted diseases. In the age of AIDS, this silence is not only impractical, but outright dangerous. Yet, according to this model, we have to return to the exact set of sexual circumstances governing early feminists. No thank you.

The advent of penicillin and antibiotics in the 1930's meant that infections could be prevented, although laws restricting LEGAL abortion still remained on the books. THe law failed to keep up with medical advances and as a result, non-connected women and their fetuses suffered at the hands of unskilled quacks who wanted to exploit the desparation of women legally prohibited from using doctors.

It is unrealistic to assume Anthony and Stanton would have opposed the relegatization of abortion in the 1960's and 1970's, just as it is to assume their actions and words in an earlier era would still have the exact same relevance today.

To use their support against racism as an analogy, although they had very enlightened attitudes for their time, Anthony and Stanton's language and acceptance of segregated facilities is unquestionably antiquated and unprogessive in today's world. However, this is the logical parallel to the anti-abortion movement's historical revisionism.

I found this book to be the missing link between the pioneering feminist advocacy of yesteryear and today's female-dominated pro-life movement. It effectively challenges the notion that feminists must, indeed CAN, defend abortion as a means of securing women's full emancipation.

The book's credibility lies in the presentation of the information. Rather than simply asserting that our feminist forebears believed such-and-such, the editors present these women in their very own words and in full context, leaving no room for speculation about exactly what they said and why.

This book ought to be required reading in every women's studies program, though the challenge it presents to neo-feminist orthodoxy is the very reason why it probably won't be.

Koukl's booklet is clearly written, but his arguments are implausible and philosophically inept. Following are some of the flaws.

Koukl writes: "You can never answer the question 'Can I kill this?' unless you've answered a prior question: _What is it?_" (p.7). This assertion begs the question against bodily-rights defenses of abortion, which deny precisely that assertion. The assertion is also inconsistent with Koukl's admission (p.10) that the foetus, even if it is a person, may be killed in self-defense.

To establish that the foetus is a member of the human species, Koukl appeals to the fictional "Law of Biogenesis": "_each being reproduces after its own kind_" (p.23). If "kind" here means "species", then the "Law" is false, for there have been many observed instances of speciation (see the talk.origins FAQ). If "kind" means something other than "species", then the fact that the foetus has parents who belong to our species does not guarantee that the foetus itself belongs to our species; merely that it belongs to our "kind" (which by hypothesis is not the same thing). While I agree the foetus is a member of the human species, Koukl's reasoning to that conclusion is flawed.

Like Francis Beckwith (_Politically Correct Death_, 1993), Koukl consistently fails to distinguish among various distinct meanings of terms such as "full humanity" (p.23), "fully human" (p.43), "human being" (pp.24-5 and elsewhere), etc. Are such terms used descriptively (i.e., in a purely biological sense) or normatively (i.e., in a moral sense)? Does "human being", for example, mean "individual member of the species _Homo sapiens_" or "being with a right to life"? Koukl never makes it clear. This is sloppy, and suggests his argument is based on equivocation.

Koukl's case for the foetus's right to life boils down to the repeated assertion that "as long as you are alive..._you are still yourself_" (p.30). In other words, foetuses must have a right to life because each of *us* was once a foetus (pp. 45, 47). But this is a mistake. From the fact (if it is one) that we were once foetuses, it *does not follow* that we had a *right to life* when we were foetuses. To make that conclusion follow, one must assume that the right to life is an essential (rather than accidental) property of those that possess it. Since pro-choicers deny this assumption, Koukl -- by simply taking it for granted -- has begged the question.

Koukl wants to argue that, since our physical bodies are always changing, what sustains our identity over time (and, somehow, what gives us a right to life) is an immaterial soul. He asserts: "If you change _all_ of [a thing's] physical parts, there can be no question that you now have something completely different" (p.37). So (he continues), since all the molecules in our bodies get changed every seven years or so, the body I have now can *at most* be seven years old; and, since *I* am plainly *more* than seven years old, I cannot be identical to my body. Rather, I must be identical with an immaterial soul (pp.37-8).

The problem here is with the claim that changing all a thing's physical parts necessarily creates a new thing. Koukl tries to support this claim with a story in which the parts of a deck (at the back of his house) are all gradually replaced -- the result, he thinks, is a new deck (pp. 35-7). Perhaps that is so (though many metaphysicians would disagree); but at most it shows that changing all of an *artefact's* parts creates a new thing. Biological organisms, unlike artefacts, actively guide and regulate their own growth and development. This self-regulated activity very plausibly allows organisms (unlike artefacts) to retain their identity despite a complete change of parts. So it is just a mistake to assume, as Koukl does, that the identity conditions for artefacts must also apply to organisms.

Of course, Koukl doesn't really believe his own arguments about souls. (1) He admits that "_our physical bodies...grow old_" (p.38); this contradicts his claim (p.38) that our bodies are at most seven years old. (2) We know some animals and trees are, say, 20 years old (cf. p.23), despite the fact that they -- like us -- presumably change all their molecules every few years. It would follow, on Koukl's argument, that trees must have immaterial souls that sustain their identity throughout this change of parts (otherwise the tree could never come to be 20 years old). But I doubt Koukl really believes trees have souls! (3) Trying to prove we are something more than our bodies, he writes: "If you *have* a body, then you are not the same thing as the physical body you possess, or else you wouldn't be able to make this claim" (p.38, my emphasis). But this is self-refuting, for by the same argument we cannot be souls: "If you have a soul," we can say, "then you are not the same thing as the immaterial soul you possess, or else you wouldn't be able to make this claim."

So Koukl has not shown we are immaterial souls. And even if he had, foetal personhood (contrary to what he thinks) wouldn't follow. Since on his view trees (and presumably animals) must have souls, and since trees and animals lack a right to life, therefore the mere fact that a being has a soul does not show it has a right to life. Perhaps Koukl would say it is having a _human_ soul that makes a difference, that gives something a right to life. But why? Why should the mere fact that a soul is *human* give it a right to life? I see no answer to this; nor does Koukl provide one.

In sum, _Precious Unborn Human Persons_ is a clear enough expression of what many pro-lifers seem to believe. Think of it as a statement of faith -- a crisp condensation of the pro-life position, useful to pro-lifers in much the same way that a dogmatic tract or the Apostle's Creed is useful to the pious. But for strong arguments that really "stand to reason" and put the pro-life position on "solid ground", this booklet doesn't cut it.